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Adverse shocks to rich countries often have a large and 
persistent negative impact on investment and output in 
developing countries. This paper examines a transmission 
mechanism that can account for this stylized fact. The 
mechanism is based on the existence of international 
financial frictions. Specifically, if a small, developing 
country has to collateralize its assets to borrow funds to 
invest, falling asset prices caused by a negative shock in 
an advanced economy worsen the developing country’s 
collateral value and reduce its ability to borrow and 
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reinvest. Hence, investment in the developing country 
declines, and international investors repatriate capital to 
the advanced country. As less capital now can be pledged 
as collateral, the developing country’s credit constraint 
is further tightened, which leads to another round of 
decline in investment. This generates a downward spiral 
that may cause large output losses to the developing 
country. The mechanism finds empirical support in the 
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11 Introduction
The 2008-2009 ¯nancial crisis without doubt is the most severe crisis since the Great Depres-
sion. Initially thought to be limited within the U.S.'s subprime housing market, the crisis
quickly spread across sectors and countries after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Septem-
ber 2008. Many developing countries also saw large declines in investment and output, in
many countries much larger declines than the U.S.'s (see Figure 1). These developments call
for explanations about how a crisis can spread from advanced countries to developing ones.
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Figure 1: GDP growth rates- Source: International Financial Statistics
The question of interest is why a negative shock in an advanced economy can have large
(sometimes larger) and persistent impacts in terms of investment and output on a developing
country. In this paper I study the following mechanism: a negative productivity shock in
a large, advanced economy drives down international asset prices. If a small, developing
country has to collateralize its assets to borrow funds to invest, falling asset prices worsen its
ability to borrow and hence to reinvest. Investment in the developing country declines, and
capital repatriates to the advanced country. As less capital now can be pledged as collateral,
2the developing country's asset value further drops, which further tightens its credit constraint
and leads to another round of decline in investment. This constitutes a downward spiral that
causes large damage to output of the developing country. Its recovery is also sluggish, since
the credit constraint prevents the country from quickly borrowing and accumulating capital.
The mechanism ¯nds empirical support in the 2008-2009 crisis data. There are sta-
tistically signi¯cant and positive relationships between pre-crisis external debt and capital
out°ows; and between pre-crisis external debt and the declines in GDP. The relationship
between the declines in stock prices and capital out°ows is less clear: although there is a
positive correlation between the two variables, it is not signi¯cant.
To the extent that relaxing credit constraints helps developing countries raise capital and
boost investment, the analysis in this paper implies that some amount of assistance from
advanced economies or international ¯nancial institutions in bad times can help developing
countries cope with negative external shocks.
The mechanism described in the paper complements a common view about the transmis-
sion of crises, in which banks in advanced countries simply pull out of emerging markets in
response to crises in their home countries. While this mechanism no doubt is in play, it does
not explain why foreign banks withdraw from one set of emerging countries and not others.
I argue that countries that have high levels of external debt and face credit constraints are
more likely to see larger capital out°ows, and larger declines in investment and GDP.
I use a modi¯ed version of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (henceforth KM) to study the
mechanism. The model features a small, developing country that borrows funds and faces a
collateral-based credit constraint, and a large, advanced country that lends to the developing
country. The model shows that when the developing country is credit constrained, a negative
productivity shock in the advanced country can cause large adverse impacts on the developing
country. This is particularly true when the developing country borrows lots of debt abroad
to invest domestically, or put di®erently, the country is highly leveraged. In those instances,
adverse external shocks can be particularly damaging to developing countries (even more
than domestic shocks).
My analysis assumes a perfectly integrated asset market: international asset prices move
in lock steps. As in KM, I simply assume the two countries use the same type of capital
and there is a competitive spot market where agents in both countries can buy and sell
capital at the market price. While the assumption is not the most realistic, it is for the
paper to focus on the link between the fall of asset prices and the declines of economic
activities in developing countries, via credit constraints. Empirical evidence, as shown in
3Didier, Love, and Martinez-Peria (2010), indicates clear comovements between the U.S.'s
and international stock prices in the 2008-2009 crisis (see Figure 10 in the Appendix for
changes in stock indices during the crisis).
This paper contributes to a large literature on crisis transmission across countries, of
which Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2003) is a good starting survey. A large number of
papers focus on trade linkages as a key mechanism for crisis transmission. Recent litera-
ture has begun to argue that ¯nancial linkages play a more important role, especially for
countries that are more ¯nancially integrated1. Among recent papers, Paasche (2001) uses
a version of the KM model to investigate a transmission mechanism between two develop-
ing countries, via adverse terms of trade shocks which are ampli¯ed by credit constraints.
Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) also look at crisis transmission between two \periphery" de-
veloping countries via the portfolio constraints in the \center" country. More recently,
Devereux and Yetman (2009) and Dedola and Lombardo (2009) focus on crisis transmission
among major economies. Korinek, Roitman, and Vegh (2010) examine how di®erent ¯nan-
cially constrained sectors transmit negative shocks via a common set of lenders.
However, there is an important di®erence between my paper and the literature. In KM,
Paasche (2001), Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) and many other papers along the same theme,
the focuses are put on the direct shocks to credit demanders/producers. Instead, I focus on
the shocks to credit suppliers. Furthermore, I show that the impact of these credit supplier
shocks on credit demanders/producers can be much more severe.
Devereux and Yetman (2009) and Dedola and Lombardo (2009) are probably the clos-
est to my paper. Theirs focus on a credit-constraint based crisis transmission mechanism
among major economies. With the presence of credit constraints in the form of KM,
Devereux and Yetman (2009) show that through inter-connected portfolios, ¯nancial de-
leveraging in one large country can spread to other major countries, causing a sell-o® in assets
and a forced reduction in borrowing among foreign investors. This, in turn, drives a fur-
ther sell-o® in the ¯rst country, creating a feedback loop. Dedola and Lombardo (2009) also
look at a similar transmission mechanism, but use a Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
version of ¯nancial frictions, rather than KM. Clearly, Devereux and Yetman (2009) and
Dedola and Lombardo (2009) have the U.S. and other major economies in mind when they
study the mechanism.
Although in the same spirit as those two papers, mine uses a simpler version of the
1Among other papers, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Calvo and Mendoza (2000),
Paasche (2001), Chari and Kehoe (2004), Pavlova and Rigobon (2008), Devereux and Yetman (2009),
Dedola and Lombardo (2009)...
4KM model to make a di®erent point, that developing countries can be particularly vul-
nerable to shocks in advanced economies. Investors in the advanced economies need not
be leveraged for the transmission to take place. Unlike Devereux and Yetman (2009) and
Dedola and Lombardo (2009), who study symmetric models, my paper stresses on asymmet-
ric impacts. The damage to the developing countries' output can be more disproportionate
and more persistent, even after the advanced economies have recovered.
My analysis is also related to a large class of models that use credit frictions to explain
¯nancial crises and \sudden stops" in emerging markets2. The contribution of this paper
is that it focuses on the North-South crisis transmission, a new phenomenon prominently
featured in the current crisis. By adopting an asymmetric two-country setup, the paper can
discuss explicitly a potentially important transmission mechanism and hence provide a clear
framework for international coordination in crises.
This paper also relates to a small but growing literature on the 2008-2009 ¯nancial crisis,
most of which has focused on the U.S. However a few papers have studied the global trans-
mission of the crisis, and they seem to point to ¯nancial channels as the key transmitter, at
least in the short run. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) ¯nd that emerging markets responded
very strongly to the deteriorating situation in the U.S. ¯nancial system and real economy
after September 2009. Didier, Love, and Martinez-Peria (2010) also ¯nd that the stock mar-
kets in many countries fell even more than the U.S.'s stock market, and the main channel
that drives the comovement between the US return and other countries' stock returns is
¯nancial. Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010) look at GDP growth of 33 countries before
and after the collapse of Lehman Brother in September 2008, and show that a higher level of
external debt pre-crisis is instrumental to the decline of a country's GDP growth. Similarly,
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) ¯nd that among others, countries' external vulnerabilities-
including a large external debt position- are helpful in understanding the intensity of the
crisis. Looking at the medium run, Comin, Loayza, Pasha, and Serven (2009) explore a dif-
ferent channel of transmission in which crises disrupt the technology transfer process between
advanced economies and developing ones, hurting developing countries in the medium run.
The paper is organized as follows. Some motivating facts are presented in section 2.
Section 3 describes the model. The solution of the model and the dynamics are analyzed in
Section 4. A bailout scenario is discussed in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2See for example Calvo (1998), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Gopinath (2004),
Cook and Devereux (2006), Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007), and Mendoza (2010)...
52 Motivating facts
In this section I look at some motivating empirical evidence for the connections between
external debt before the 2008-2009 crisis, the declines in stock prices, capital out°ows, and
the declines of GDP during the crisis. The set of countries is emerging markets with quarterly
data. External debt data are from the Joint External Debt Hub-JEDS. The proxy for
capital out°ows is the decline in countries' external debt position. Data for stock indices are
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Figure 2: External debt pre-crisis and capital out°ows
Crisis data indicate signi¯cant negative impacts of external debt pre-crisis on capital
out°ows and output during the crisis. However, the relationship between capital out°ows
and declines in stock prices is less signi¯cant. Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between
external debt in quarter I, 2008 and the decline in external debt position between quarter III
of 2008- the time Lehman Brothers collapsed- and quarter I of 2009, for a set of 36 emerging
countries. External debt and changes in external debt are measured as percentages of 2007
GDP. Negative numbers indicate shrinkages of external debt (i.e. capital repatriation). It is
statistically signi¯cant that countries with higher levels of external debt pre-crisis (i.e. high
Á) see larger declines in external debt level (the t-statistic is -4.03).
When it comes to changes in stock indices, Figure 3 indicates a positive relationship be-
tween ¯nancial out°ows and the declines in stock indices for 30 emerging countries. However,























































































Changes in stock indices (Apr09−Jul07), %
Figure 3: Change in stock indices and capital out°ows
Finally I look at changes in GDP and the levels of external debt pre-crisis. Figure 4
presents a scatter plot of GDP growth and external debt for 27 emerging countries. The
values on the Y-axis represent percentage changes in GDP between quarter III, 2008 and
quarter I, 2009. It is statistically signi¯cant (t-stat is -2.75) that countries with higher levels
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Figure 4: External debt pre-crisis and GDP growth
3If Kyrgyz Republic is removed from the sample, the relationship is more signi¯cant: the t-stat rises to
-3.07.
7Similar empirical evidence regarding the adverse impact of large external debt position on
output is also found elsewhere in the literature (for example Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010)
and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) discussed above).
3 The model
3.1 Model setup
Consider a two-country world that consists of a large, advanced economy (called country A)
and a small, developing country (called country D). Country D faces a collateral-based credit
constraint, and country A does not. The two countries have the same decreasing returns to
scale production technology, but the advanced country has accumulated more capital (per
capita). This implies that the marginal product of capital in country A is lower than that of
country D. If the credit constraint were not present, country D would borrow from country
A and accumulate more capital until the two countries have the same level of capital. As
in KM, the collateralized credit constraint captures imperfect ¯nancial markets: lenders can
not force borrowers to repay their debt unless the debt is secured.
There are two kinds of goods: a durable asset (capital) and a non-durable good. It is
assumed, as in KM, that the total stock of capital is ¯xed4. Capital does not depreciate and
there is a competitive spot market where agents in both countries can buy and sell capital
at the market price.



































t+1 is the borrowing of a representative household/¯rm of country D, Rt is the interest
4This assumption is for simplicity; relaxing this assumption would not change the intuition of the model.
8rate, qt is the market price for capital (in units of consumption). The country uses its output,
its borrowing and the value of its asset/capital to ¯nance consumption, debt repayments and
the purchase of capital for production next period. Capital has two functions: it is used as
an input in the production process and also as collateral. Country D can only borrow up to






In a standard macroeconomic model without credit constraints, the developing country
borrows more for investment, increases production and grows through the accumulation of
capital. The marginal productivity of the two countries are equalized in the equilibrium.
When the credit constraint is present however, the developing country's borrowing capacity
is limited: it has a lower level of capital stock than the advanced country. As a result, it has
a higher marginal productivity and it is optimal for them to invest as much in capital as the
borrowing constraint allows.
Consider the advanced economy (country A). The country has an identical production
function as country D, but has accumulated more capital and hence their marginal produc-
tivity of capital is lower.










ct + bt+1 + qtkt+1 = ztk
®
t + Rtbt + qtkt (2)
where zt also follows an AR(1) process
zt = ½zt¡1 + "t
and bt+1 is the lending from a representative household/¯rm of country A. Here I assume
¯ > ¯¤. This assumption ensures that country D is more impatient and borrows from
country A.
I also assume the two countries are di®erent in their sizes. I normalized the size of country
D to one, and denote N as the size of country A. The market clearing conditions for the

































t+1 + qt+1) + ¸tÁqt (7)
¸t is the shadow value of relaxing the credit constraint. A positive ¸t implies that the
constraint binds: the developing country would like to borrow more for production and
consumption but cannot.












t+1 + qt+1) (9)
Equation (9) states that the marginal utility loss of investing one additional unit of
capital equals the expected marginal utility gain from investing that unit. The gain consists
of the marginal product from that unit, and the potential increase in asset/capital prices.
(9) indicates that at the margin, capital is priced by the advanced country.
















Denoting ut ´ qt ¡ 1
Rt+1qt+1, following KM, ut is de¯ned as the user cost of capital. In
the case of ¾ = 0 (risk neutral agents) and no uncertainty, we would obtain the same result
as in KM: the marginal productivity of the advanced country equals the user cost of capital.
The equilibrium is de¯ned as a sequence of capital holdings, debt outstanding, prices of
capital, consumption and interest rate fkt;k¤
t;bt;b¤
t;qt;ct;c¤
t;Rtg that satis¯es the ¯rst order
conditions and the market clearing conditions.
103.3 The transmission mechanism
Before proceeding to solve the model, it is useful to examine the transmission mechanism in
which a shock can spread across countries (section 4.2 explains this in more detail).
Consider a negative shock to country A. After the shock, asset price falls. A falling asset
price worsens country D's ability to borrow and reinvest. Its borrowing and capital stock
decline as a consequence. This leads to a further decline in the value of its total assets,
further tightening the borrowing constraint and reducing its capital stock. This constitutes
a downward spiral that could cause severe damage to the developing country's output. The
mechanism is summarized in the diagram below:







Why does the asset price fall? It falls via the following channels: the ¯rst one is the
expected decrease in future productivity in country A due to the persistence of the shock. The
second channel which is more important, is the change in the marginal rate of substitution.
Note that after the shock, consumption falls. Since agents are risk averse, falling consumption
reduces their marginal rate of substitution: the marginal utility of current consumption
increases, that is, agents value current consumption more. This pushes the interest rate up,
and the asset price goes down as a consequence:
zt +=) ct +=) MRS +=) Rt *;qt +
Note that in this model, capital repatriation is not the main factor that drives the asset price
down. This is an important di®erence to KM. In the KM model, the asset price declines
because capital moves from more e±cient producers (i.e. farmers) to less e±cient producers
(i.e. gatherers). This is not the case here: although capital does move from the developing
country to the advanced country, where it has a lower return, it does not signi¯cantly change
the advanced country's capital stock, and hence has only a marginal impact on the asset
price. The decline in consumption, combined with risk aversion is the main factor that
generates the decline of the asset price5. The role of risk aversion is crucial here, because
if agents are risk neutral, as in KM, a decrease in consumption has no impact on marginal
utility.
5Jeanne and Korinek (2010) describe a similar mechanism in which a reduction in asset prices operates
through a decline in consumption.
114 Solution of the model
I solve for the ¯rst order approximation of the model. All the benchmark parameters are
chosen as standards. Following Korinek (2010), I choose Á = 0:5. Regarding the size of the
two countries, I choose N = 10, i.e. the population of country A is 10 times larger than
country D.
¾ Risk aversion 2
¯ Discount factor country A 0.98
¯¤ Discount factor country D 0.97
® Share of capital in production 0.33
Á Borrowing constraint coe±cient 0.5
½z Persistence of AR(1) shocks 0.5
K Total Capital 10
N Relative size of country A 10
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
4.1 The deterministic steady state
















¤¡¾R + ¸ (14)






Equation (15) states that the price of capital equals the discounted stream of the marginal
product of capital in the advanced country. The more capital the advanced country holds,
the lower the price of capital.
From (12) and (14):
¸c




From (16) and ¯¤ < ¯, we can see that ¸ > 0. This implies that the credit constraint
12binds in the steady state equilibrium. The developing country borrows as much as it can
from the advanced country and its marginal productivity is higher than that of the advanced
country. In the neighborhood of the steady state, the credit constraint always binds, as in
KM.
The values of the variables in the steady state are given in the table below:
K K¤ Y Y ¤ C C¤ B B¤ Q R ¸
0.93 0.66 0.97 0.87 0.99 0.76 0.56 5.65 17.09 1.02 0.0179
Table 2: Steady State Values
4.2 Dynamics
4.2.1 No credit constraints
This section considers a benchmark case with no credit constraint. This is for us to contrast
the di®erent responses in terms of capital movements and output with the case when the
constraint is in place.
Without the credit constraint, the two countries have the same level of capital (per capita)
in the long run and no borrowing takes place. Suppose there is a 1% negative productivity

















































































































































































































































































3After the shock, the asset price falls via the following channels: ¯rst is the expected
decrease in future productivity due to the persistence of the shock. Second is the change in
the marginal rate of substitution. As section 3.3 explains, the second channel is the main
mechanism in which the asset price falls. Persistence of the shocks seems to play a smaller
role, because the asset price also falls by about the same amount if the shocks are iid, as
seen in Figure 11 in the Appendix.
Notice that decoupling occurs: capital °ows from country A to country D. This is a
standard result: country D borrows from country A to ¯nance the purchase of capital, and
gradually returns the debt. If the credit constraint is in place, capital movements will be
di®erent. A falling asset price will have negative implications on the borrowing capacity of
country D: country D will not be able to borrow due to a decline in their collateral's value.
We will witness capital out°ows from country D, as the subsequent section will analyze.
4.2.2 With credit constraints
This section ¯rst considers the dynamics of the world economy after an unexpected negative
productivity shock to the advanced economy (country A). It shows the impact of the shock
on the developing country is more severe and persistent than that on the advanced economy.
I also examine the dynamics of the world economy after a negative productivity shock
of the same size to the developing country (country D). I show that a negative shock to the
developing country can actually cause less damage to the developing country than a negative
external shock does.
Finally I consider the dynamics of the system when the developing country is more
leveraged. I will show that a more leveraged developing country su®ers more.
Let us start with a -1% technology shock on country A (Figure 6). The values on the
Y-axis represent percentage deviations from the steady state values. After the negative
shock, output in country A returns to the normal level. Output in country D does not
change on impact, but declines afterward due to the decline in its capital stock. Why does
its capital stock decline? Here the negative productivity shock in the advanced economy
depresses the asset price. As should be clear by now, the falling asset price worsens the
developing country's ability to borrow and reinvest. The falling asset price, the collapse of
investment and a tightened budget constraint form a self-enforcing mechanism that causes
severe damage to the developing country's output. The downward spiral happens in period
1 after the shock.

















































































































































































Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a -1% negative productivity shock to the Advanced
economy
change in the marginal rate of substitution. The decrease in the asset price, in combina-
tion with the presence of credit constraints, generates a fundamentally di®erent direction of
capital °ows to the benchmark case: in response to negative shocks in advanced countries,
capital actually repatriates from developing countries to developed ones. This is an interest-
ing result that is in line with what has happened in the current crisis. It is fair, however, to
note that in the model, I assume the total stock of world capital is ¯xed, so if a country is
credit constrained, capital has to go to the other country. Having said that, if one thinks of
¹ K as the total world saving, which does not change rapidly over a short period of time, the
model describes an interesting phenomenon in the current crisis.
Going back to the impulse responses, output in the developing country gradually returns
to the normal level because the country's capital slowly accumulates, which limits their
ability to borrow. The sluggish return of country D's output to the normal level explains
why in the long run, output of country D can be more volatile than that of country A, even
in the case that the technology shocks only occur in country A. I show in the simulation
that this is the case. With the benchmark parameters, even when the productivity shocks
in country D are completely shut o®, country D's output is more volatile than country A's
in the long run.
A fall in country D's capital stock implies that country A accumulates more capital,
which drives the marginal product and the asset price down. However due to a much larger
size of country A, a reallocation of capital out of country D would have very little impact on
15the capital stock of country A. This has implications when we consider a -1% productivity






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































f Á = 0:7. With a higher leverage level, the developing country witnesses larger





















































































































































































Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a -1% negative productivity shock to the Advanced
economy, the Developing country is more leveraged
country. The larger decline in borrowing is not due to the interest rate however, as the inter-
est rate rises to a similar level as before. Instead, it is due to a sharper deterioration of their
borrowing capacity. As a result, the developing country's capital out°ows, its investment
and output declines are larger.
In the simulation I run 200 simulations each of 100 periods. I shut down the z¤ shocks
(productivity shocks of country D) and only leave the z shocks (productivity shocks of
country A) with the standard deviation of 0:01 (1% deviation on average). Then I repeat
the exercise with di®erent values of the leverage ratio (Á). The long run standard deviations
of output are reported in the table below. As can be seen from the table, at the benchmark
value Á = 0:5, country D's output is even more volatile than country A's. The relative
volatility is larger when country D is more leveraged.
Stdev of country A's output Stdev of country D's output
Á = 0:1 0.0054 0.0004
Á = 0:5 0.0050 0.0079
Á = 0:9 0.0049 0.0355























































































































































































Figure 9: Impulse Responses to a -1% productivity shock to the Advanced economy, and a
loan of 0.05% of the Advanced country's output
5 A bailout scenario
This section illustrates a situation in which a bailout loan from the advanced country can
help the developing country relieve the credit constraint to some extent. The bailout is
Pareto-improving: both countries are better o® with the bailout.
Figure 9 shows the impulse responses to a -1% productivity shock to the advanced coun-
try. In the period after the shock, the government of the advance country decides to lend
0.5% of its output to the developing country at the prevailing market interest rate. The
loan is to be repaid the following period, when another loan is made. For every subsequent
period, the new loan is reduced by 50%. Note that the amount and the terms of the loan are
arbitrary and by no means optimal. The point of this section therefore is just to illustrate
that a bailout can be Pareto-improving.
The developing country bene¯ts from the bailout loan. Due to the credit constraint, it
can not even borrow as much as it would like at the market rate. As a result, this bailout
loan provides the developing country credits that they can use to patch up their collateral
and maintain some of their borrowing capacity. In the period after the shock, capital in
the developing country falls much less than otherwise, thanks to the loan. Ultimately, the
declines in investment and output in the country are more modest.
The advanced country at least is not worsen o® because it makes a loan at the rate equal
18to its marginal return on investment.
Note that the bailout hinges on the assumption that the advanced country's government
has a better enforcement mechanism to ensure repayment than the private sector. This
allows the advanced country's government to make loans to the developing country, when
the private sector is no longer willing to lend even at a higher interest rate.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model to examine a transmission mechanism in which a produc-
tivity shock originating from an advanced economy can have potentially large and persistent
impacts on a developing country's investment and output. The transmission works through
the global integration of asset markets and the credit constraint of the developing country.
The impact can be particularly devastating if the developing country is highly leveraged.
The results ¯nd some empirical support with the 2008-2009 crisis data.
To the extent that relaxing credit constraints in bad times will help developing countries
raise capital and boost investment signi¯cantly, some amount of assistance, in the form of
grants or long term debt, from advanced economies or international ¯nancial institutions
can help developing countries recover from a recession caused by a negative external shock.
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Figure 11: Impulse Responses to a -1% negative productivity shock to the Advanced
economy- No credit constraint- iid shocks
23